Abstract. A crucial parameter for increasing the retirement age is the earlyretirement discount of the public pension system. Critics of the present German system argue that the downward adjustment of the pension for early retirees is too small compared with a 'fair' system and thus encourages early retirement. We discuss several notions of 'fairness' of early-retirement provisions and propose a concept called 'distributive neutrality', which states that the ratio between total benefits and total contributions should not depend systematically on the individual's ability. By applying this concept to the German retirement benefit formula and taking empirically estimated relationships between annual income (as a proxy for ability), life expectancy and retirement age into account, we show that at the present discount rate of 3.6% per year there is redistribution from low to high earners, which, surprisingly, could be attenuated by raising the discount rate.
INTRODUCTION
Declining fertility and increasing longevity have rendered public pension systems in many OECD countries unsustainable and have triggered substantial reforms of these systems. One of the officially declared reform objectives is to increase the average retirement age. Crucial parameters for this endeavor are first the legal retirement age and secondly the earlyretirement provisions inherent in the public pension system. In Germany, for example, legal retirement age will be gradually increased from 65 to 67 years over the period 2012-29. When this reform was enacted, there was vigorous criticism by the trade unions who claimed that for physically demanding occupations such as roofers it would be unacceptable to work beyond age 65, and it was emphasized that, presently, labor force participation of males aged 60-65 is still pretty low. Of course, in a free society nobody can be forced to work. Therefore, in Germany as in any public pension system workers are allowed to retire up to five years before reaching the legal retirement age, but then their pension level is cut by 3.6% per year of early retirement. Similar regulations exist in other OECD countries with discounts between 4% and 7% per year in the majority of countries (see Figure 1 ). Taking these early-retirement provisions into account, it is argued that the increase of the legal retirement age amounts to nothing but a cut in the level of retirement benefits by 7.2% because many workers could not react to the reform by working longer but had to suffer the early-retirement discount instead.
Furthermore, it is well known that life expectancy after reaching age 60 is positively correlated with previous earnings (see e.g. Reil-Held, 2000) . Thus, workers at the low end of the earnings distribution are said to be faced with Hobson's choice: either they work until legal retirement age and accept an extremely short (expected) duration of benefits or they retire as early as possible and accept the maximum cut in the benefit level. Hence, it seems that by lowering early-retirement discounts their plight could be eased and the extent of implicit redistribution from the poor to the rich due to the mentioned correlation could be reduced.
It is the purpose of this paper to examine whether a cut in early-retirement discounts is suitable to reduce the extent of 'unfair' income redistribution in the German social security system. To this end we must first develop an appropriate notion of fairness. It turns out that in the relevant literature reviewed in Section 2, there are several quite different concepts of fairness and that the 'right' notion of fairness depends on the objectives pursued in the design of pension systems, which can range from the pure efficiency goal of achieving a 'distortion-free' retirement decision to the very ambitious equity goal implicit in maximizing a social welfare function in the tradition of optimal taxation theory. In Section 3, we point out the problems attached to both of these 'extreme' positions and propose a more modest concept of fairness called 'distributive neutrality', which is inherent in the constitution of the German pension system and which says that the rate of return on total contributions to the pension system should not depend systematically on the individual's ability. In Section 4, we examine the implications of this concept for the possibility to lower the extent of redistribution by changing the size of the early-retirement discounts. To this end we explore the relation between lifetime earnings and the benefit-contribution ratio in a large dataset provided by the German social security administration. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
CONCEPTS OF FAIRNESS

Homogeneous workers: concepts of efficiency
There is widespread agreement that social insurance systems should be so designed as to achieve a given distributive target with the least degree of distortions to individual decisions on education, labor supply, savings and other behavior. As an example, the German Old Age Insurance system is based on a tight tax-benefit linkage called 'Teilhabe-Ä quivalenz' (fairness within cohorts), a feature that is explicitly aimed at minimizing labor-supply disincentives. Such efficiency criteria are particularly important in a world of equals, in which distributional concerns play no role. However, we shall show that in the design of social security systems there is more than one possible efficiency rule.
No distortion of work incentives
A straightforward target is the neutrality of the early-retirement provision with respect to the labor supply decision of the worker: the pension system should not distort the choice of retirement age (Börsch-Supan, 2000 , 2004 . This implies that net social security wealth, i.e. the present value of all future retirement benefits minus contributions, is not changed when the worker retires one period later (or earlier). This feature of a pension system is also called 'marginal fairness'. The normative appeal of marginal fairness is the strongest in a world of equals because in this case equity concerns do not play a role and thus the pure efficiency goal of an undistorted choice prevails as the single objective. Moreover, marginal fairness has unambiguous implications only when the length of remaining life is certain because only in this case can the present value of extra retirement benefits be calculated so that it exactly matches the 'pension costs' of retiring one year later. In theory, the implications of marginal fairness are straightforward: the costs of retiring one year later are composed of the contributions paid to the pension system and the forgone benefits during the extra work year. If the length of the retirement period were known, the additional benefits could be calculated so that they exactly match this amount in present value. The discount rate to be applied in this calculation should be the 'market interest rate', preferably the rate at which workers can shift their consumption possibilities over time. In the case of a worker who already disposes of savings that he can adjust to the changing stream of pension benefits (and contributions), the interest rate on government bonds seems to be the appropriate one. Matters become more complicated for a worker who has no savings apart from his social security wealth and who does not want to change his consumption pattern when he decides to work another year. This person will want to shift consumption from the retirement period to the present period by borrowing against his pension entitlements, which would require a much higher interest rate such as the one banks charge for overdraft loans.
In the practice of the German pension system, matters are complicated by the fact that retirement benefits accrue in proportion to total earnings during working life. As a consequence, the contributions paid in an extra year of working life already translate into additional benefits, where the 'rate of return' equals the implicit rate of return of the pay-as-you-go system, viz. the growth rate of earnings, which is considerably smaller than the interest rate. To achieve marginal fairness of the total return on the sum of contributions and forgone benefits, therefore, the rate of return on the forgone benefits must be much higher than the interest rate.
Minimizing the burden on other generations
Incentive compatibility may be a sensible target in a one-household economy but it becomes questionable as soon as an infinite sequence of overlapping generations is considered. A much more convincing objective for this case is the requirement that the behavior of the retiree does not place a burden on others, in particular on later generations of taxpayers. With this consideration, Ohsmann et al. (2004) justify the claim that the discount rate used for making present-value calculations should equal the rate of return of the PAYG system, viz. the growth rate of earnings, g. Their reasoning says that, as any euro paid in period t as a contribution to a PAYG-financed social security scheme yields (1 þ g) euros in additional retirement benefits in period t þ 1 -holding everything else constant, the same should be true of an additional euro paid or forgone due to postponing retirement by one period. Furthermore, they argue that the adjustment rate currently in place in Germany of 3.6% per year comes close to this figure.
To assess the validity of this claim, we must make a distinction between two types of PAYG systems:
(a) a pure PAYG system that never holds any fund balances ( positive or negative) but adjusts the contribution rate instantaneously to keep total contributions and total payouts of retirement benefits in line at every moment in time, and (b) a mixed system in which the pension administration is allowed to borrow and save on the capital market to smooth short-run fluctuations of the contribution rate.
In case (b), additional contributions and forgone benefits of a person who postponed retirement by one period could be accumulated by the fund and used to pay out the additional claims accruing to that individual over the course of his retirement period. But then it is again the interest rate on the capital market, r, which is the appropriate rate of return. Clearly, it is questionable if such a system can be called PAYG and the procedure described here requires that 'additional' revenues due to changes in retirement age be distinguished from 'ordinary' revenues. On the other hand, it can be argued that this case is relevant for the German situation in which almost 30% of all pension outlays are financed by subsidies from the federal budget. Provided that fluctuations in net revenues do not lead to changes in the contribution rate but rather adjustments of the state subsidies and indirectly of government debt, the opportunity cost of paying one euro in period t is in fact paying (1 þ r) euro in period t þ 1. In contrast, in a pure PAYG system of type (a), a shift of the retirement age of a particular individual i from period t to t þ 1, holding everything else constant, translates into a cut in the contribution rate in t but an increase in this rate in the s periods until the death of this individual. Thus it is impossible to leave all other participants in the system unaffected because it makes all contributors (workers) in period t better off and all workers in the periods up to t þ s worse off, and so it affects participants differently according to their birth year.
Instead of the impossible target of sheltering everybody else from any consequences of individual i's behavior, a more modest target could be achieved, viz. keeping the contribution rate and the implicit taxes due to participating in the PAYG system from rising in a new steady state when all workers starting with a particular cohort increase their retirement age by one year. This question has been analyzed by Breyer and Kifmann (2002) , and the answer is that the rate of return must not exceed the growth rate g to keep the long-run contribution rate and implicit tax rate constant. Of course, a number of cohorts in the transition period benefit from lower contribution and implicit tax rates. 
Heterogeneous workers: concepts of welfare maximization
With inequality in initial endowments of productivity, health or life expectancy, efficiency is not the only objective in designing a pension system, and equity considerations come into play. The usual procedure chosen in the optimal taxation literature is to first propose a (Utilitarian) social welfare function and to derive a first-best allocation, and in a second step to make realistic assumptions on the observability of distinguishing characteristics and derive a second-best solution and propose a system of incentives that are suitable to bring about the second-best allocation in the presence of these informational constraints.
2.2.1. Heterogeneity in productivity and health Cremer et al. (2004) 1 consider a world in which workers differ in two unobservable characteristics, productivity and health, whereas life expectancy is still the same for everybody. Health status is here distinguished by the rate at which disutility from working increases over the life cycle, with faster growth indicating worse health. In a first-best solution, consumption is the same for all types, but sick people are allowed to retire earlier than healthy ones, and the differences in income are equalized using person-specific lumpsum transfers.
With asymmetric information, when productivity and health are positively correlated but unobservable and period income and retirement age are observable, the desired redistribution from the high productivity and the healthy to the low productivity and ill types can be accomplished by positive marginal taxes both on period income and on the length of the working life (ibid., p. 2272). By taxing longer stays in the job (i.e. subsidizing early retirement), the ill type can be induced to retire earlier whereas the healthy type, who would lose more income from retiring early, can be discouraged from mimicking the ill type and thus, by using this additional incentive, the self-selection constraint can be relaxed, which means that the tax rate on period income can be lowered. Interestingly, the same result obtains if individuals differ in either productivity or health but not both.
According to this result, generous early-retirement provisions can be interpreted as some kind of disability insurance in a world in which health and thus disability cannot be ( perfectly) monitored. The result is the more remarkable as it is not based on any differences in life expectancy in the population.
Heterogeneity in life expectancy
Another potential source of inequality is life expectancy. This is particularly relevant in the context of social security systems because total retirement benefits depend as much on per-period benefits as they do on the length of the retirement period, a fact that is often overlooked in the design of these systems.
This point is taken up by Bommier et al. (2005) who assume that length of life is certain but varies across individuals. The authors consider a benevolent social planner who maximizes a utilitarian welfare function, which is concave in individual utilities, which can be justified either with inequality aversion or with risk aversion with respect to length of life. If length of life were public knowledge, (first-best) welfare maximization would entail that the long lived retire later and consume less per period than the short lived.
When length of life is private knowledge, a typical optimal taxation situation occurs in which the social planner can only achieve a second-best optimal allocation in which various pairs of consumption and retirement age are offered in such a way that the long lived do not benefit from mimicking the short lived. The screening instrument proposed by the authors is a ( positive or negative) 'retirement bonus' B(z), which depends on retirement age z and is added to an individual's gross earnings. The central result of the paper (ibid., p. 14) states that when disutility from work is linear in the length of the working-life, then B 0 (z)o0, i.e. the retirement bonus is falling in retirement age, which means that there is an implicit tax on working more years. The intuition behind the result is that the desired redistribution from the long lived to the short lived can be accomplished by taxing continued activity because the long lived have a stronger demand for retirement consumption and therefore more incentives to work longer.
FAIRNESS WHEN INCOME AND LIFE EXPECTANCY ARE CORRELATED: THE CONCEPT OF DISTRIBUTIVE NEUTRALITY
The concepts of pure efficiency discussed in Section 2.1 are not appropriate in a world of heterogeneous individuals. On the other hand, the welfare criteria used in the approaches described in Section 2.2 are based on highly controversial normative foundations. First, individual utilities must be assumed to be measurable on a cardinal scale and interpersonally comparable. Second, a specific functional form of the social welfare function must be given. Finally, specific policy implications can only be derived if the functional form of the individual utility functions is given as well. Thus while these approaches are useful in uncovering the relationship between certain widely held value judgments concerning equity and the general design of social security systems, more specific implications on the size of adjustment rates for early retirement cannot be expected from these exercises.
Therefore, in the following we shall propose a more modest concept of 'fairness' of social security systems, which is consistent with the usual 
66
concept of fairness as distributive neutrality and has the advantage of giving rise to specific propositions on the 'fair' size of early-retirement discounts.
The principle of 'Teilhabe-Ä quivalenz' underlying the design of the German social security system is based on the general notion of distributive neutrality: within a cohort, the expected retirement benefits shall be proportional to total contributions paid over the working life. The specific way in which this principle is implemented, however, consists in making per-period retirement benefits proportional to total contributions, disregarding the length of the benefit spell. This is innocuous as long as there is no systematic variation in life expectancy across social groups. However, it becomes highly questionable when life expectancy is positively correlated with income, education and other indicators of social status (Breyer, 1997) , and there is ample evidence from many countries that this correlation indeed exists (for Germany, see e.g. Reil-Held, 2000; von Gaudecker and Scholz, 2007) .
Given these observations, we postulate the following 'fairness' criterion:
Definition 1. 'Distributive neutrality' is satisfied in a social security system if the ratio between total benefits and total contributions does not vary systematically with average annual earnings.
This criterion is modest in so far as it does not advocate a specific equity norm, but only reformulates the principle of 'Teilhabe-Ä quivalenz' in such a way as to leave room for taking certain well-established empirical relationships between longevity, wages and retirement age into account. In fact, it is compatible with any social welfare function as long as the government disposes of a second instrument for redistribution such as an income tax, which is geared toward maximizing social welfare. For, when a post-tax income distribution is given, all the public pension system does under distributive neutrality is levying a proportional tax on lifetime income on every member of a specific generation. This tax is given by the product of the pension contribution rate and one minus the ratio of total lifetime benefits to total lifetime contributions. Under distributive neutrality, the latter ratio is independent of productivity and thus post-tax income distribution is only scaled down by a fixed factor but otherwise not changed.
DISTRIBUTIVE NEUTRALITY AND EARLY-RETIREMENT DISCOUNTS IN THE GERMAN PENSION SYSTEM
Theory
In this section we shall examine whether the ideal of distributive neutrality among different ability groups in the population is met in the German public pension system and, if not, whether early-retirement discounts can be an instrument to achieve this goal. Obviously, for this to be possible, a number of restrictive assumptions must be met. In particular, the processes governing retirement and death must be 'laws of nature' linking ability to work and life expectancy to labor productivity, measured by wages. In other words, we assume that the separation from the labor force is not a conscious decision following a rational tradeoff between cost and benefits of retirement but is dictated, for example, by insufficient health.
2
We first calculate the benefit-contribution ratio of an individual i with labor productivity a i who retires at age E i and dies at age L i as follows. Let E 0 be the age at which a worker becomes eligible to early retirement without taking any health-related contingencies into account. After this date, potential future contributions and benefits are discounted with the real interest rate r. At age E 0 , his accumulated lifetime income is denoted Y i 0 . According to the benefit formula valid in this system, annual benefits B i are proportional to his total (taxable) lifetime income, Y i , and are subject to a discount rate x for every year of retiring earlier than at age 65. Therefore, if they are discounted to age E 0 , they are given by
On the other hand, total contributions C i are proportional to lifetime income and consist of two parts: those contributions which were paid before age E 0 and which are proportional to total income up to this age, Y i 0 , and the discounted value of future contributions up to the chosen retirement age E i ,
where c denotes the contribution rate. We do not discount previous contributions for two reasons. First, this is consistent with German pension law, which treats all contributions equally, no matter when they were paid; and secondly we cannot observe the time path of contributions but only the sum; hence, we could not implement discounting in our dataset. Hence, the ratio of total benefits and total contributions for individual i, r i , is determined by
Distributive neutrality is then satisfied if there is no systematic (monotonous) relationship between the benefit-contribution ratio r and ability a, while the system is redistributive in a regressive ( progressive) way if r is an increasing (decreasing) function of a. Observe that by equation (3), the relation between r and a depends on the value of the early-retirement discount rate x. Now, to examine the relationship between r and a empirically, we can choose between two different estimation strategies, which we will call (a) the indirect method and (b) the direct method.
The indirect method is based on postulating the existence of systematic relationships E(a), L(a), Y(a) and Y 0 (a), and estimating these four functions using our data to be described below. Inserting the estimated functions into equation (3), we can then synthetically construct the relationship r(a|x). In contrast, the direct method consists in estimating the function r(a|x) directly using (3) and then regressing it on a.
Preliminary tests show that the direct method gives slightly more reliable results because the goodness of fit of the regression equations for E(a) and L(a) turns out to be fairly low, despite the significance of a. In the following, we thus present only the results generated by the direct method of estimation.
Empirical estimation
Data
The variables used in this analysis are taken from a dataset on pension discontinuations from 1994 to 2005, FDZ-RV (2007), published by the Federation of German Pension Insurance Institutes (Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund). It contains a 10% sample of all discontinued public pensions due to the death of the beneficiary, which amounts to roughly 828,000 observations. However, each observation corresponds to a pension, and not to an individual retiree, who can (subsequently or even simultaneously) benefit from more than one pension. Taking this into account, we are left with a sample of 752,380 pensioners whose benefits are based on own contributions. The most important variables are the sum of pension benefit claims (in points), the length of the work life, the retirement age and the age at death. From the first two variables we construct the average claims earned per year of work. One point corresponds to contributions based on one year of the average annual income. Other variables that are contained in the dataset have to be taken with care -they are only reliable when they have been used for the calculation of benefits, otherwise they are either unreliable or missing. See Table 1 for descriptive statistics of the variables used.
Weighting function
Our sample suffers from a selection bias. Since we observe a death cohort, life expectancies are biased downwards. In each death cohort, a large variety of birth cohorts are included, and we know that life expectancy has been increasing with the year of birth.
3 However, this increase is only partially taken into account in the sample, as especially individuals from younger birth cohorts (whose ex ante life expectancy should be higher) only appear in the sample if they died relatively young. Ideally, we would like to observe a birth cohort of which all individuals have already died; obviously, this is only possible for very old birth cohorts (born around 1900) in order to get unbiased estimates. However, as life expectancy has been increasing over time, these very early birth cohorts may not be representative for more recent cohorts and therefore not suitable for drawing policy conclusions.
Our approach to correcting the selection bias is the following. The selection that occurs is not based on individual decision-making -it is solely a matter of data selection. Among the later birth cohorts, deaths at young age are over-represented. The relationship is empirically linear (which corresponds to the usually perceived increase of life expectancies); 4 hence, a linear weighting function, which decreases with the birth year, can correct this bias. However, ex ante we cannot be sure about the slope of weighting function; we only know that the weights have to be linear and non-negative over the whole support. The parameter of choice is therefore only the slope, while the intercept serves as a normalizing constant that limits the range of the potential slopes in order to ensure the non-negativity constraint. If GBJ denotes the year of birth (normalized to 0 for the earliest birth cohort), the weighting function w takes the following form, with s being Bundesamt (2007, p. 54) , and own calculations. the slope parameter:
With the intercept set to 1, s can vary between 0 (hence, a weight of 1 for all birth cohorts) and 0.0103, which just ensures that the weight for the latest birth cohort is still positive. The selection criterion for our choice of the slope parameter remains to be determined. We select the weighting function that minimizes the difference between the weighted average life expectancy in our data and the exogenously known life expectancy. Yet, the maximum average age at death obtained with this method (i.e. the one that results from the steepest weighting function) is still lower than the value of life expectancy observed in population statistics. 
Imputation of missing values
For the construction of our variable 'ability', we have to observe the years of contribution. Owing to a change in legislation, the sample lacks this variable for those pensioners who retired into the old-age pension before 1992. In 1992, the calculation of pension benefits changed, due to the introduction of early-retirement discounts, which did not exist before. Although the years of contribution had played a role for pension eligibility and the size of benefits even before 1992, we are unable to retrieve these data. This phenomenon would aggravate the selection bias we introduce above, because the earliest possible retirement age into an old-age pension in 1992 was 60 for women and (under certain health-related contingencies) 63 for men, imposing an upper bound on observed age at death. Following the taxonomy of Little and Rubin (2002, pp. 4, 12) , the missing data problem we face is univariate and the data are missing at random, since the mechanism driving the 'missingness' is based on observables only. Note that the mechanism is not completely random, which would imply independence from all variables we observe.
We apply 'best-subset' regression imputation based on the following list of variables: sum of benefit claims, year of birth, sex, year of first pension benefit payment, first year of actual pension benefit payment and dummies for manually calculated pensions, for public health insurance, for old-age pension and for each federal state (or foreign residence). Regressing the non-missing subset of the variable 'years of contribution' on the above-mentioned variables (or a subset of them, once the regressors themselves suffer from missing values) yields a prediction by which we replace the missing values. If we find this prediction to be smaller than 1 (which is unreasonable), we replace it with 1. The censoring is only necessary for 1.3% of the observations, such that our 5. Notice, however, that the concept of life expectancy in a given year always refers to agespecific death rates of this year and not to the average age at death of the death cohort of this very year. results are robust against the application of other procedures, for example the exclusion of unreasonably low values. Since the imputation procedure adds uncertainty to the following regression, we bootstrap the standard errors to take this into account.
Fairness of Early-Retirement Provisions
Regression results
In principle, more than one definition of retirement and therefore of the benefit spell can be distinguished. Our variable retirement age E is the age of the first receipt of any pension based on own contributions, which can be the old-age pension, but also disability pensions. This notion is in line with our theoretical approach because it takes all paths into retirement including disability pensions into account. In so far as claiming disability benefits carries some information on the innate ability (including the health capital) of the individual, this is certainly the superior concept compared with the alternative of taking the first receipt of an old-age pension as the age of retirement.
Furthermore, the following procedures were performed with the data. We drop unreasonably high values of the resulting average claims per year (above 3). Then, observations on women were excluded. Since ability (or the earnings capacity) cannot be observed directly, it has to be ensured that the average benefit claims are a good proxy. In the simplest case, namely when an individual has worked during his whole career and contributed to the public pension system, benefit claims are a linear transformation of income.
6 This even holds if the individual under observation had longer times of education before starting to work or if he or she raised children. The measure is then only slightly diluted, as claims are increased by these activities in order to compensate for the loss of regular contributions. The close relationship between total income and benefit claims, however, is not guaranteed once the individual has been self-employed or has worked as a civil servant for some time in his career. During these times, usually no contributions are paid, as membership in the public pension system is not mandatory (or even possible) anymore. We therefore restrict our sample to male pensioners who worked at least 25 years in a job where contributions are mandatory. This sample contains 357,241 observations. Our results differ compared with the ones using the whole sample, but are robust with respect to the exact choice of the number of years required.
In this dataset we do not observe the value of Y 0 , which we can construct by
The ability variable a lies in the interval (0, 2.8]. The upper bound is higher than what could have been achieved by contributions based on work only, in which case we had a max 5 2.15. However, we cannot unambiguously distinguish between claims earned because of own work or because of times of education, parenting and other reasons, which slightly augments the average claims per year of work.
To estimate the relationship between the ratio of benefits to contributions and ability for a given value of the discount x, we assume a polynomial of degree 5 to account for possible non-linearity and non-monotonicity:
See Table 2 for the estimation results and Figure 2 for the respective plotted functions, with discounts ranging from x 5 0.00 to 0.08, where the fitted ratio functions r(a) are ordered from top to bottom with respect to x, and we find the ratio with the smallest early-retirement discount at the top. At current discounts of x 5 0.036, the benefit-contribution ratio is an increasing function over the bigger part of a; hence, we find a regressive effect of the pension system.
Achieving distributional neutrality
If we want to apply our criterion of distributional neutrality to the different r(a|x) functions, given that x is a constant, the return functions have to be linearized. We then compare the linear return functions r lin(a|x) with respect to their slope parameter and choose the discounts x that minimize the absolute value of this slope. As the method of linearization we choose least squares, because it inherently takes the distribution of ability a into account. By this method, we fit straight lines to the return functions shown in Figure 2 (the direct estimates of r) based on different discount rates. The discount rate that minimizes the slope of r lin turns out to be 0.07116. See Figure 3 , where the original return function r(a|x 5 0.07116) is compared with the resulting linearized form. In general, the slope of the linearized forms is decreasing over the choice of discounts. These higher discounts flatten the benefitcontribution ratio, but at the same time, lower the average r as compared with the current discounts of x 5 0.036. Hence, we find that the current discounts of x 5 0.036 are too low to achieve distributional neutrality. The main reason for this result is the negative relationship between ability and retirement age, which is consistent with the findings by Berkel and Börsch-Supan (2004) . However, this result might be specific for the time period in which our data were generated: the individuals under observation died between 1994 and 2005. With an average benefit duration of approximately 16 years, many retired in the 1980s, a period in which the federal government allowed the rather excessive use of early-retirement schemes. Additionally, these early-retirement schemes were offered mainly by large companies, which are known to pay higher wages for the same level of qualification. Hence, our measure a does not only capture ability, but also differences in firm size, economic sector, etc., and along these dimensions possibilities to retire early differed for (otherwise equal) individual workers. We therefore propose to see our results as an exemplary 
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application of a method to achieve distributional neutrality within the public pension system, whereas actual policy advice should be based on more recent data, which allows inference on the behavior of future retirees.
Despite the very low R 2 we already observe in the estimations, we can interpret distributional neutrality also statistically; a regression of r at neutral discounts of 7.116% on a alone (without adding a higher polynomial in a) yields an R 2 of 0, and the impact of a is not only 0 with respect to its size, but also not significantly different from 0 as well.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we discussed several notions of 'fairness' of early-retirement provisions in pay-as-you-go financed public pension systems. We advanced the thesis that the 'right' notion of fairness depends on the objectives pursued in the design of pension systems, which can range from the pure efficiency goal of achieving a 'distortion-free' retirement decision to the very ambitious equity goal implicit in maximizing a social welfare function in the tradition of optimal taxation theory. We pointed out the problems attached to both of these 'extreme' positions and proposed a more modest concept of equity, called 'distributive neutrality', which is based on the notion that the rate of return on total contributions to the pension system should not depend systematically on the individual's ability.
By applying this concept to the German retirement benefit formula and taking empirically estimated relationships between average annual income (as a proxy for ability), life expectancy and retirement age into account, we were able to calculate the relationship between average annual income and the benefit-contribution ratio, which is increasing over a wide range of parameter values. Thus distributive neutrality is presently violated but instead there is systematic redistribution in favor of high-ability persons. As this group is not only enjoying higher life expectancy but -at least according to our data -also retires earlier, lowering early-retirement discounts, for example proposed by Sheshinski (2003) , would in this case exacerbate this redistribution. It should be emphasized that our empirical approach is based on the unrealistic assumption that the choice of retirement age is not already affected by the existing early-retirement discounts. If this were indeed the case, as could be expected, we would have to replace the implicitly assumed E(a) function by a relationship of the form E(a; x). The present dataset does not allow estimating such a function as the discounts were phased-in gradually and thus a corresponding variable would be perfectly correlated with a time trend. Moreover, different groups of persons were subject to different values of x, but we did not have this information.
